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Countries around the world have become increasingly integrated from an economic point of view
in the last few decades. However, the process of liberalization has been uneven across the three
dimensions of globalization: trade, international capital ﬂows and immigration (Faini 2002, Findlay
and O’Rourke 2002; Obstfeld and Taylor 2002). For example, the extraordinary increase in trade
v o l u m e si nt h ep o s tW o r l dW a rI Ie r ah a sn o tb e e nm a t c h e db yap a r a l l e lr i s ei nl a b o rﬂows.
An important determinant of these patterns is domestic policies, which have displayed a clear
asymmetry with respect to trade and capital movements on the one hand, and immigration on
the other (Rodrik 2002). Governments have been much more willing to open up their borders to
trade and capital ﬂows than to migration. Survey data can reveal whether this variation in policy
outcomes originates from diﬀerences in public opinion towards these policies. In this paper I use an
individual-level survey dataset and empirically analyze attitudes towards trade and immigration,
in a sample of several countries, in comparative terms. I ﬁnd that, while opinions on trade and
immigration are positively correlated at the individual level, respondents are on average more pro-
trade than pro-immigration. The literature on labor-market determinants of preferences cannot
explain the observed diﬀerence in attitudes: It shows that, over long-run horizons, preferences
over the two alternative globalization strategies behave in a similar manner. In this paper, on the
other hand, I focus on the short run and ﬁnd evidence of one important source of this diﬀerence:
the cleavage in trade preferences, absent in immigration attitudes, between individuals working in
traded as opposed to non-traded sectors.
2D a t a
The source of individual-level data analyzed in this paper is the National Identity module of the
International Social Survey Programme (ISSP 1995) that covers more than 20,000 respondents
from several countries at diﬀerent stages of economic development. I use answers to the following
two questions to construct measures of attitudes towards trade and immigration, respectively:
“(Respondent’s country) should limit the import of foreign products in order to protect its national
economy: (1) agree strongly, (2) agree, (3) neither agree nor disagree, (4) disagree, (5) disagree
strongly, (8) can’t choose, (9) NA."; and "There are diﬀerent opinions about immigrants from
other countries living in (respondent’s country). (By “immigrants” we mean people who come
to settle in (respondent’s country).) Do you think the number of immigrants to (respondent’s
country) nowadays should be: (1) reduced a lot, (2) reduced a little, (3) remain the same as it
is, (4) increased a little, (5) increased a lot, (8) can’t choose, (9) NA.” For each dimension of
globalization, I construct both an ordinal (Trade Opinion and Immig Opinion) and a dichotomous
measure (Pro-Trade Dummy and Pro-Immig Dummy) of favorable individual preferences.1
While it is diﬃcult to compare the two sets of attitudes, given the diﬀerent wording of the
questions, the summary statistics of the four measures shed light on broad patterns in the data
1For the precise deﬁnition of the attitudes measures, see end of Table 1. All four variables treat “can’t choose”
and “NA” answers as missing values. My results do not change qualitatively if I keep the “can’t choose” and “NA”
observations in the deﬁnition of the two dichotomous variables as answers against trade and immigration, respectively.
1(Table 1). Based on Pro-Trade Dummy and Pro-Immig Dummy, 23% of respondents in the overall
sample opposes limits to the import of foreign products, while only 7% would like the number of
immigrants to increase. In addition, each country in the sample displays higher average values
for Pro-Trade Dummy than for Pro-Immig Dummy, although there is substantial variation across
nations: the Netherlands (39%) and Canada (21%) are the most pro-trade and pro-immigration,
respectively, while Bulgaria (9%) and Latvia (0.4%) are the most protectionist and against migra-
tion, respectively. The values of the ordinal measures of attitudes conﬁrm these patterns, although
the diﬀerence in preferences is less pronounced: in the overall sample, Trade Opinion is on average
equal to 2.46 while Immig Opinion is on average equal to 2.13. Only 4 out of the 22 countries in
the sample (Austria, Ireland, Bulgaria, Spain) have higher average values for Immig Opinion than
for Trade Opinion. In sum, these statistics suggest that individuals are on average more pro-trade
than pro-immigration across countries, especially considering that the trade question clearly has a
protectionist bias (Hiscox 2006) while the migration question is worded in neutral terms.2
The two sets of attitudes are also positively and signiﬁcantly correlated at the individual level
in nineteen out of the 22 countries considered, as shown in the last column of Table 1. However the
correlations are not particularly high. Therefore the evidence presented so far is consistent with
a situation in which a few common factors aﬀect the two types of preferences with similar signs
and magnitudes, while some of the forces at work in anti-immigration attitudes are absent or less
pronounced in the case of trade in the majority of countries.
3 Long-Run Labor-Market Determinants of Attitudes
In long-run models of trade and migration, where factors are intersectorally mobile, international
diﬀerences in relative factor endowments give rise to disparities across countries in terms of goods’
prices and rates of return to factors. These disparities, in turn, create an incentive for countries to
exchange goods and services and for factors to move across national borders. Absent international
productivity diﬀerences, countries receive and give up the services of the same factors of production
through trade and immigration, indirectly and directly, respectively. That is, trade and migration
are substitutes. For example, skill-abundant countries tend to import low-skill intensive products
and receive immigrants who are less skilled than natives on average. The opposite is true in
the case of skill-scarce countries.3 Since the same changes in relative factor supplies take place,
skilled and unskilled wages will be similarly aﬀected by the two dimensions of globalization. As a
consequence, individual preferences on trade and immigration should be positively correlated and
similarly impacted by the level of individual skill. The empirical evidence in the existing literature
2Using the same dataset, Rodrik (2002) documents no signiﬁcant diﬀerence across trade and immigration opinions
when the same trade question and the following immigration question are analyzed: "How much do you agree or
disagree with the following statement? Immigrants are generally good for (respondent’s country’s) economy". This
result is not inconsistent with the one based on Pro-Immig Dummy. It is not surprising that trade and migration are
more similarly perceived, when individuals are asked more speciﬁcally about the economic impact of immigration and
on the economy as a whole. Non-economic and individual economic eﬀects are more likely to give rise to asymmetric
and more anti-immigration views.
3If there are productivity diﬀerences across countries, trade and migration patterns could be diﬀerent. For example,
in the case of migration, both skilled and unskilled labor tend to move to a technologically-advanced country, since
both skilled and unskilled wages are likely to be higher there than in the rest of the world.
2is consistent with this conclusion, as shown in columns (1) and (6), Table 24 (O’Rourke and Sinnott
2001, 2006, Mayda and Rodrik 2005, Mayda 2005, Scheve and Slaughter 2001a, 2001b).
First, skilled individuals are more likely than unskilled ones to favor free trade in skill-abundant
countries, and less likely in skill-scarce countries (regression (1)). This is consistent with the
Heckscher-Ohlin model and, in particular, with the Stolper-Samuelson theorem which says that
owners of a country’s abundant factors should gain from a trade liberalization while owners of
scarce factors should lose. Second, skilled respondents favor immigration in countries that receive
unskilled immigrants (on average, relative to the native population) and oppose it in countries that
receive skilled immigrants (regression (6)).5 This is consistent with the factor-proportions-analysis
and Heckscher-Ohlin models. The immigration results require that factor-price insensitivity does
not hold, which is true if the country’s output mix is not suﬃciently diversiﬁed — that is, there
are more primary factors of production than internationally-traded goods6 — or if the immigration
shock is large enough in size to change the country’s output mix or, ﬁnally, if the country is a large
open economy.
4 Short-Run Labor-Market Determinants of Attitudes
I now consider labor-market determinants of trade and immigration preferences in a short-run
sector-speciﬁc model, where factors are immobile across sectors (I assume for simplicity that there
are no mobile factors in the economy). I use the sector classiﬁcation adopted in Mayda and
Rodrik (2005) and diﬀerentiate sectors according to whether they are comparative-advantage (CA),
comparative-disadvantage (CD) or non-traded (NT) sectors. A sector is deﬁned as a CA sector if
its adjusted net imports are negative and as a CD sector if its adjusted net imports are positive
(the adjustment is for aggregate trade deﬁcits/surpluses). Finally, respondents are assigned to the
NT sector category if they work in the service sector broadly deﬁned (as, for example, doctors,
jurists, teachers, workers in religion, etc.).7
While the type of good produced in a sector, whether traded or not, is associated with a
signiﬁcant cleavage in preferences over trade policy (regression (2)), the same pattern does not
characterize immigration-policy attitudes (column (7)): Working in a NT sector increases the
likelihood of being pro-trade by three percentage points, while it does not aﬀect migration attitudes.
4The regression table reports the coeﬃcient estimates from estimation of a probit model with the dichotomous
indicator as the dependent variable. All regressions include country dummy variables, to control for unobserved
additive country-speciﬁce ﬀects: Therefore country ﬁxed eﬀects net out the impact of aggregate variables - such
as trade and immigration policies, the business cycle, etc - which is homogeneous across fellow citizens. Standard
errors are robust and clustered by country, to address heteroskedasticity and allow for correlation across individual
observations within the same country.
5Per-capita GDP levels (PPP-adjusted) are used as a proxy for countries’ relative skill abundance — since commonly
used country-level education data suﬀers from some clear problems where the countries in the sample are concerned
(Mayda and Rodrik 2005, footnote 19) — and as a proxy for destination countries’ relative skill composition of natives
to immigrants — since per-capita GDP and the skill mix of natives to immigrants are positively and signiﬁcantly
correlated (Mayda 2005).
6It does not matter whether the country produces non-traded goods, as long as the latter condition on traded
ones is satisﬁed.
7Notice that some sectors in the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Russia, Latvia and the Slovak Republic can be classiﬁed
as traded sectors, but there is no trade data available to determine whether they are CD or CA sectors.
3The coeﬃcient on non-traded sector in the trade equation remains positive and signiﬁcant (at the
5% level), once I control for long-run labor-market determinants (that is, once I include both the
direct and interacted eﬀects of education) ,a ss h o w ni nr e g r e s s i o n( 3 ) . 8 Thus workers in non-traded
sectors feel shielded from foreign competition working through trade but not from labor-market
competition of immigrants. These results are intuitive, since immigrants can work in both traded
and non-traded sectors, while trade liberalization does not directly aﬀect incomes in non-traded
sectors. Indirectly, if the income elasticity of demand for non-traded goods is positive, a movement
towards free trade will imply an increase in the prices of non-traded goods since national income
will go up. In turn, higher prices of non-traded goods will raise incomes of factors speciﬁct ot h e
non-traded sector (Scheve and Slaughter 2001b).
Column (4) in Table 2 shows that respondents who work in CD sectors are signiﬁcantly less
likely to be pro-trade, compared to individuals in non-traded sectors, as already found in Mayda
and Rodrik (2005). In regression (9) I ﬁnd that immigration preferences too are signiﬁcantly
more negative if the respondent works in a CD as opposed to a non-traded sector.9 This result is
consistent with the evidence, documented in the literature (Faini and Venturini 1994, Coppel et al.
2001), that import-competing sectors rely heavily on migrant labor. In other words immigration is
more likely to increase the relative supply of factors speciﬁc to CD sectors and, therefore, decrease
rates of return to these factors. The result in column (5) is also plausible from a theoretical
point of view in a Ricardian framework: Immigration expands the range of goods produced by
the destination country, which absorbs immigrants in sectors with low productivity that would
disappear without immigration (Treﬂer 1998). Finally, notice that the marginal eﬀect of CD sector
is smaller in absolute value for immigration than it is for trade. The coeﬃcient estimates in Table
2 imply that working in a CD sector decreases the likelihood of being pro-trade by 3.1 percentage
points and of being pro-migration by 1.2 percentage points.
5C o n c l u s i o n s
Restrictive migration policies in destination countries around the world coexist with more and
more liberalized trade regimes. This pattern in governments’ policies is consistent with public
opinion, as documented in this paper using the ISSP data set.10 I ﬁnd that, while preferences on
immigration and trade are positively correlated, individuals are on average more pro-trade than pro-
migration. This asymmetry in attitudes towards trade and immigration is interpreted as a puzzle in
the literature (Faini 2001) since, in standard economic (long-run) models, trade and migration are
substitutes: Those groups in the population who beneﬁt with a trade liberalization are likely to gain
thanks to immigration. The literature on labor-market determinants of preferences shows that trade
and migration are indeed perceived as substitutes in the long run but, as a consequence, cannot
explain the diﬀerence in attitudes. This paper, on the other hand, provides a plausible explanation
8In terms of variance explained, long-run labor-market determinants contribute more than non-traded sector.
9The coeﬃcient on CD sector remains negative and signiﬁcant (at the 10% level) in both the trade and migra-
tion regressions, once I control for long-run labor-market determinants (that is, once I include both the direct and
interacted eﬀects of education), as shown in regressions (5) and (10), respectively.
10Hatton (2006) doubts that diﬀerences in average attitudes between trade and migration are enough to explain
the gap in policy outcomes.
4of the puzzle by looking at labor-market eﬀects taking place in the short run. The main ﬁnding
of the empirical analysis is that a key source of the diﬀerence in attitudes is the cleavage in trade
preferences, absent in immigration attitudes, between individuals working in traded as opposed to
non-traded sectors.
Moving beyond the labor market, trade and migration diﬀer along many dimensions, which
could provide alternative explanations of the divergence in attitudes between them. Some of these
dimensions have been investigated by the literature, while others should be the focus of future
research. Hanson, Scheve and Slaughter (2005) draw attention to the role of public-ﬁnance concerns:
While immigrants can contribute to and beneﬁt from the welfare state, imports of goods and services
can do neither of these. More in general, Hanson, Scheve and Slaughter (2005) point out that the
impact of free trade on advanced countries’ welfare state is likely to be minimal.11 Assuming this
is true, the argument in Hanson, Scheve and Slaughter (2005) is a good explanation of diﬀerences
in attitudinal responses if immigrants are perceived as a net burden for the destination country’s
welfare state, as in the U.S.. However, this might not be true in other countries, for example if the
skill composition of immigrants relative to natives is high. Facchini and Mayda (2006) ﬁnd that,
if the latter condition holds, individual attitudes are consistent with a perception of immigrants as
net contributors to the welfare state.
Another line of research should focus on the diﬀerence in the size of the impact of non-economic
factors given that the social and cultural eﬀects of immigration are likely to be more pronounced
than with trade.12 Finally, another way to understand the preference gap is by realizing that
immigrants or their children can acquire citizenship and voting rights and, therefore, aﬀect the
destination country’s political balance across diﬀerent groups (Ortega 2004). To the extent that
natives do not favor this inﬂuence of outsiders on political life, this channel can provide another
explanation of the preference gap.
To conclude, several new works in the literature point out that the gains from liberalizing inter-
national labor movements are likely to be substantial, almost surely larger than the beneﬁts from
removing existing trade barriers (Rodrik 2002). Yet it has proven diﬃcult, from a political point
of view, to realize these gains through liberal migration policies, as opposed to what has happened
with trade policy. The discussion in this paper clariﬁes sources of diﬀerences between trade and
immigration attitudes, which in turn aﬀect policies, and provides evidence on one explanation of
t h ep r e f e r e n c eg a p .
11See Rodrik (1998), and Mayda, O’Rourke and Sinnott (2006) for an alternative view.
12Non-economic factors are not likely to bias my results since I control for the individual’s level of education in all
regressions of Table 2.
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Germany West 15.27 24.08 18.45 27.18 9.06 5.96 2.90 0.39 46.29 23.43 17.63 2.04 0.49 10.12 1.74 0.03 0.35*
Germany East 25.98 30.39 16.99 17.32 4.74 4.58 2.42 0.23 51.63 20.26 16.83 1.14 0.65 9.48 1.66 0.02 0.37*
Great Britain 23.48 40.1 18.45 12.27 1.45 4.25 2.25 0.14 40.1 23.77 25.89 2.8 1.06 6.38 1.94 0.04 0.32*
USA 21.6 43.74 16.03 9.69 2.75 6.18 2.24 0.13 29.69 25.19 21.83 4.58 2.14 16.56 2.09 0.08 0.24*
Austria 38.04 32.39 10.6 12.51 3.83 2.62 2.09 0.17 28.36 24.72 37.74 2.93 0.81 5.45 2.19 0.04 0.26*
Hungary 45.26 25.81 15.93 6.96 2.62 3.43 1.92 0.10 55.95 24.19 13.51 0.71 0.71 4.94 1.59 0.01 0.15*
Italy 25.73 34.8 14.56 16.12 6.5 2.29 2.42 0.23 41.76 30.31 19.87 2.56 0.82 4.67 1.85 0.04 0.25*
Ireland 24.26 41.49 10.7 19.57 2.75 1.22 2.34 0.23 6.63 13.56 55.35 15.6 2.24 6.63 2.93 0.19 0.17*
Netherlands 5.2 24.04 28.36 31.81 5.49 5.1 3.09 0.39 26.37 30.99 30.79 4.42 0.68 6.75 2.16 0.05 0.28*
Norway 9.19 28.86 27.52 22.28 4.77 7.38 2.83 0.29 29.53 29.26 27.32 5.7 1.21 6.98 2.14 0.07 0.24*
Sweden 12.72 28.28 29.98 17.18 6.08 5.75 2.74 0.25 35.66 29.25 21.88 4.13 2.11 6.97 2.01 0.07 0.25*
Czech Rep. 25.29 26.65 17.8 17.25 9.58 3.43 2.58 0.28 39.75 25.75 21.14 1.9 0.27 11.2 1.84 0.02 0.16*
Slovenia 24.03 26.83 17.95 20.46 3.96 6.76 2.50 0.26 29.92 29.92 31.76 1.35 0.39 6.66 2.06 0.02 0.11*
Poland 30.06 34.82 12.71 11.77 2.63 8.02 2.15 0.16 25.92 17.53 19.91 4.13 1.82 30.68 2.11 0.09 0.16*
Bulgaria 53.57 23.8 4.98 3.26 4.52 9.86 1.68 0.09 32.58 17.19 9.77 2.17 1.54 36.74 1.78 0.06 0.07
Russia 35.57 24.56 11.65 15 6.84 6.39 2.28 0.23 16.08 22.15 22.28 3.99 1.46 34.05 2.28 0.08 0.14*
New Zealand 18 34.18 19.82 19.11 5.06 3.84 2.57 0.25 26.79 31.65 24.06 8.59 2.22 6.67 2.23 0.12 0.32*
Canada 14.26 32.28 21.45 21.52 5.65 4.84 2.71 0.29 16.48 20.58 32.89 12.17 5.99 11.9 2.67 0.21 0.28*
Philippines 12.73 53.69 16.33 15.24 0.84 1.17 2.37 0.16 31.91 27.14 25.63 7.2 3.77 4.36 2.20 0.11 0.04
Japan 14.09 16.8 29.54 14.97 19.03 5.57 3.09 0.36 13.38 21.82 35.03 10.11 2.95 16.72 2.61 0.16 0.22*
Spain 21.23 50.08 10.98 9.26 0.98 7.46 2.12 0.11 8.77 26.64 45.49 6.39 1.07 11.64 2.60 0.08 0.18*
Latvia 53.52 19.14 9.38 8.46 4.43 5.08 1.85 0.14 49.74 20.05 17.19 0.26 0.13 12.63 1.64 0.00 0.07
Slovak Rep. 26.68 28.71 16.05 16.05 8.6 3.9 2.49 0.26 30.22 24.51 24.3 1.81 0.65 18.51 2.00 0.03 0.13*
 Whole Sample  23.57 31.4 17.86 16.57 5.43 5.17 2.46 0.23 29.6 24.59 26.27 4.82 1.6 13.12 2.13 0.07 0.21*
Standard Deviation 1.20 0.42 1.01 0.26
Bold numbers correspond to highest and lowest values. The sample excludes all individuals who are not citizens of the country where they are interviewed.




Table 1: Summary Data on Individual Attitudes towards Trade and Immigration (ISSP data set)
Trade Opinion  uses answers to the trade question ("Now we would like to ask a few questions about relations between (R's country) and other countries. How much do you agree or disagree with
the following statement: (R's country) should limit the import of foreign products in order to protect its national economy.") and ranges from 1 (agree strongly) to 5 (disagree strongly). Pro-
Trade Dummy equals one if Trade Opinion  is equal to 4 or 5, zero if Trade Opinion  is equal to 1, 2 or 3. Immigration Opinion  uses answers to the immigration question ("Do you think the 
number of immigrants to (R's country) nowadays should be ...": reduced a lot, reduced a little, remain the same as it is, increased a little, increased a lot) and ranges from 1 (reduced a lot) to 5 
(increased a lot). Pro-Immig Dummy equals one if Immigration Opinion  is equal to 4 or 5, zero if Immigration Opinion  is equal to 1, 2 or 3. All four variables (Trade Opinion, Pro-Trade 


















Trade OpinionProbit with country dummy variables 123456789 1 0
Dependent variable
age -0.0024 -0.0022 -0.0024 -0.0016 -0.0018 -0.001 -0.0006 -0.0009 -0.0008 -0.0011
0.0017 0.0017 0.0017 0.0016 0.0016 0.0016 0.0015 0.0016 0.0016 0.0017
male 0.2655 0.282 0.2864 0.2848 0.2895 0.0834 0.0907 0.0932 0.0918 0.0943
0.0468** 0.0492** 0.0496** 0.0509** 0.0513** 0.0415* 0.0423* 0.0423* 0.0435* 0.0433*
parents' foreign citizenship 0.0619 0.069 0.0631 0.0722 0.0661 0.2405 0.243 0.2419 0.2161 0.2152
0.0321+ 0.0324* 0.0317* 0.0337* 0.0331* 0.0498** 0.0499** 0.0498** 0.0472** 0.0475**
education (years of education) -0.5054 0.0679 -0.5181 0.0685 -0.5297 -0.433 0.0581 -0.4393 0.0585 -0.4446
0.0903** 0.0117** 0.0905** 0.0114** 0.0803** 0.1304** 0.0135** 0.1315** 0.0138** 0.1316**
education*gdp 0.0608 0.0618 0.063 0.0517 0.0522 0.0527
0.0097** 0.0097** 0.0087** 0.0147** 0.0148** 0.0148**
non-traded sector 0.1112 0.1222 0.0476 0.0596
0.0542* 0.0476* 0.0449 0.0469
CA (comparative-advantage) sector -0.0482 -0.0801 -0.0405 -0.0775
0.0912 0.0715 0.0615 0.061
CD (comparative-disadvantage) sector -0.1134 -0.0933 -0.1241 -0.1053
0.0501* 0.0518+ 0.0593* 0.0591+
constant -1.5133 -1.2358 -1.5896 -1.1719 -1.5077 -3.0044 -2.7331 -3.0434 -2.6513 -2.9409
0.1404** 0.2026** 0.1389** 0.1784** 0.1375** 0.2140** 0.1837** 0.2211** 0.1812** 0.2098**
number of obs 12429 12429 12429 11675 11675 11365 11365 11365 10707 10707
Pseudo R-squared 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11
parents' foreign citizenship  is coded as follows: 1=both parents are citizens; 2= only mother/father is citizen; 3=neither parents are citizens.
gdp is the log of per capita GDP in 1995, PPP (current international dollars).
Table 2: Trade vs. Immigration Preferences (ISSP data set)
 The sample excludes all individuals who are not citizens of the country where they are interviewed. 
The table reports the coefficient estimates from estimation of a probit model. All regressions include country dummy variables. Robust standard errors clustered by 
country are presented under each coefficient estimate. + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
A sector is defined as a CA (comparative-advantage) sector if its adjusted net imports are less than zero, as a CD (comparative-disadvantage) sector if its adjusted 
net imports are greater than zero. Finally, respondents are assigned to the NT sectory category if they work in the service sector broadly defined (as, for example, 
doctors, jurists, teachers, workers in religion, etc.).
Pro-Immig Dummy Pro-Trade Dummy
2 R 2 R